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ABSTRACT 
 
The Mexico Soft Drinks case arose out of a trade dispute between the United States 
and Mexico relating to the market for sweeteners in North America.1 This paper will not only 
provide the background of WTO dispute settlement mechanism and background of the case 
but also show pop-up legal issues including the impacts of the decision. This case also 
provides a dramatization of the weakness of the WTO dispute settlement on (i) Jurisdiction 
of the WTO Panel and (ii) its authority to apply other dispute settlement provision of regional 
trade agreement to the WTO dispute.  
This paper has found that (i) WTO Panel can exercise its jurisdiction under WTO 
Covered Agreement only and (ii) they cannot apply other RTA’s to the WTO dispute. 
Furthermore the impacts of this decision raised up a problem of overlapping between RTA 
and WTO agreement. 
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* Nattapat Limsiritong is now working on his PhD in International Economic Law 
under scholarship of Xiamen university at School of Law, Xiamen university, Xiamen, China  
1 WTO, Report of the Panel on Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (7 October 2005), p. 18, < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/308r-0_e.doc 
> at 22 August 2013. 
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บทคดัย่อ 
 
คด ี Mexico Soft Drink ไดก่้อใหเ้กดิขอ้พพิาททางการคา้ขึน้ระหว่างประเทศสหรฐัอเมรกิา
และประเทศเมกซโิก ในประเด็นการน าเขา้สนิค้าประเภทสารท าความหวานในตลาดทวปีอเมรกิา
เหนือ บทความนี้ นอกจากจะน าเสนอถงึความเป็นมาของระบบการระงบัขอ้พพิาทขององคก์รการคา้
โลกและความเป็นมาของคดแีลว้ ยงักล่าวถงึ ประเดน็ทางกฎหมายทีเ่กดิขึน้ รวมถงึผลกระทบของค า
ตดัสินด้วย คดีนี้ได้แสดงให้เห็นถึงข้อบกพร่องของการระงบัข้อพพิาทขององค์กรการค้าโลก ใน
ประเดน็ (1) เขตอ านาจของคณะพจิารณาขององค์กรการค้าโลก และ (2) อ านาจในการบงัคบัใช้
บทบญัญตัขิองสนธสิญัญาการค้าในระดบัภูมภิาคอื่น ในเรื่องการระงบัขอ้พพิาท กบัขอ้พพิาทของ
องคก์รการคา้โลก  
บทความนี้ ศึกษาพบว่า (1) คณะพิจารณาขององค์กรการค้าโลกมเีขตอ านาจพิจารณาแต่
เฉพาะในกรณสีญัญาอนัเกีย่วขอ้งกบัองคก์รการคา้โลกเท่านัน้ และ (2) คณะพจิารณาขององคก์รการคา้
โลกไม่มอี านาจบงัคบัใชบ้ทบญัญตัขิองสนธสิญัญาการค้าในระดบัภูมภิาคอื่นกบัขอ้พพิาทขององค์กร
การค้าโลก นอกจากนี้ ผลกระทบของค าตดัสนิในคดน้ีีก่อให้เกดิปญัหาความซ ้าซอ้นของการบงัคบัใช้
บทบญัญตัริะหว่างสนธสิญัญาการคา้ในระดบัภูมภิาคกบับทบญัญตัขิององคก์รการคา้โลก 
 
BACKGROUND OF WTO 
The World Trade Organization, as we all knows as WTO, is an international 
organization, which regulates the rules for the global trading system and resolves any 
disputes exist between its member states.  The main mission of the WTO is to increase 
international trade by promoting lower trade barriers and providing a platform for the 
negotiation of trade to their business.  This includes the Ministerial Conference, which is the 
decision-making body of the WTO.  The Ministerial Conference is also handled by three 
main groups which are (1) the General Council, (2) the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), 
and (3) the Trade Policy Review Body (“TPRB”).  Moreover, there are other councils (such 
as Council for Trade in Goods,2 Council for Trade in Service,3 and Council for Trade-Related 
                                                          
2 The Council for Trade in Goods is responsible for the workings of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). 
3 The Council for Trade in Services is responsible for the workings of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”). 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights4) and other specific committees (Such as Committees 
on Trade and Environment, Committees on Trade and Development, Committees on 
Regional Trade Agreements, and etc.) 
In brief, apart from hosting negotiations on global trade rules, the WTO is to act as 
an international arbitrator of disputes between WTO members thru the DSB.5 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 
When the member states are unable to resolve their trade dispute by negotiation, 
the intervention of the WTO dispute settlement provision will take placed in order to settle 
the issue at hand and produce an acceptable solution for each member states.  Dispute 
settlement is the central pillar of the global trading system and this makes the rules set out 
by the WTO be effectively enforceable.6 There are five topics that we should elaborate upon 
before entering into case study (Mexico Soft Drinks) which are as follows: (i) definition and 
character of the dispute settlement provision, (ii) objective of the dispute settlement provision, 
(iii) the DSB, (iv) the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and (v) the enforcement of the 
decision. 
 
(I) Definition and character of the dispute settlement method 
In general, when the parties cannot settle their dispute, they might need third person 
to be their arbitrator in order to find out the reasonable settlement through methods of the 
dispute settlement as follows; 
 
                                                          
4  The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is 
responsible for the workings of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”). 
5  WTO, History of WTO ,<http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_ 
e/fact1_e.htm> at 22 August  2013. 
6 World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division, Understanding 
the WTO, p.55, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm> at 20 
August 2013. 
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Negotiation – A consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement 
on a disputed or potentially disputed matter without the intervention of third parties.7 
   This method is the first mentioned principal between the States, not just because it 
is always the first way to be tried and is often successful, but because the States may 
believe its advantages to be so great as to rule out the use of other methods.  Moreover, 
the negotiation between the States is usually represented through diplomatic channels by 
the diplomatic representatives (such as ambassadors or equivalent).8 The negotiation are 
sometimes ineffective if the parties refuse to have any dealings with each other because 
their positions are far apart and there are no common interests to bridge the gap.  However, 
for the WTO disputes between each state, this method is very helpful for the WTO Members 
in order to settle disputes.  
Mediation – A method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a third party who tries to 
help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.9 
   This method shall be applied when the parties are unable to resolve its dispute by 
negotiation.  The intervention of a third party (so-called Mediator) is a possible means of 
breaking the deadlock of dispute and producing an acceptable solution for the parties.  
Basically, the mediator may just encourage the disputing parties to resume negotiations, or 
may do nothing more than provide them with a channel of communication.  In this manner, 
the mediation cannot be reached without the parties’ consents.10  
Conciliation – A method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to 
which a commission set up by the parties, either on a permanent basis to deal with a dispute, 
proceeds to the impartial examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of a 
                                                          
7 Bryan A. Garner, Black Law Dictionary, 1996 West Publishing Co, Second Pocket 
Edition, p.472. 
8  J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, Sweet & Maxwell, First edition 
(1983), pp.2-7. 
9 Bryan A. Garner, Black Law Dictionary, 1996 West Publishing Co, Second Pocket 
Edition, p.444. 
10  J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, Sweet & Maxwell, First edition 
(1983), pp.20-21. 
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settlement susceptible of being accepted by them, or of affording the parties, with a view to its 
settlement in which they may have requested.11 
   In brief, the conciliation means a settlement of a dispute in an agreeable manner.  If the 
negotiation and mediation method cannot resolve the parties’ dispute, the parties may agree to 
set up a bilateral commission in order to make clear the questions in dispute and to suggest the 
terms of a possible settlement.12  
Arbitration – A method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are 
agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.13  
   The arbitration provides the parties with the additional opportunity to obtain a 
decision (“Award”) from the arbitrator of their own choice.  This method can also be used to 
produce a solution to a selected problem and on any agreed basis.  Moreover, the Award 
shall be binding the parties, but not necessarily final.  This is done so in order for the 
parties to be able to take further proceeding to interpret, revise, rectify, and to appeal the 
Award. 
In general, the means available for the settlement of international disputes are 
divided into two groups as (1) negotiation, mediation and conciliation, and (2) arbitration and 
judicial settlement.14 In brief, the group no.1 is termed as a diplomatic means because the 
parties retain control of the dispute and may or may not accept a proposed settlement as 
they see fit.  On the other hand, the group no.2 shall be used when the parties want a 
binding decision on the basis of international law.15 
   For the WTO dispute settlement, a dispute may arise between each WTO members 
because one country adopts a trade policy or takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO 
members consider to be breaking the WTO agreements (such as GATT, GATS, and TRIPS), or fail 
                                                          
11 Ibid.,p.52 
12 Ibid.,p.60 
13Bryan A. Garner, Black Law Dictionary, 1996 West Publishing Co, Second Pocket 
Edition, p.41.  
14 Judicial settlement involves the reference of a dispute to the World Court or some 
other tribunal. (such as European Court of Human Rights) 
15 J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, Sweet & Maxwell, First edition 
(1983), pp.70-71.  
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to follow through on their obligations.16 The WTO shall take control of disputes in the WTO through 
the DSB on the basis that the priority is to settle disputes, not to pass judgment. 
 
(II) Objective of the dispute settlement provision 
“Equitable, fast, effective, mutually acceptable” This is a main objective of the WTO 
dispute settlement provision.  In this way, under the old GATT, the WTO dispute settlement 
could not complete their principles as of yet because it had no fixed timetables, the rulings were 
easier to block, and many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively.  Additionally, after 
the Uruguay Round agreement, the WTO introduced better discipline for the length of time with 
flexible deadlines set in various stages of the procedure.  The agreement also highlights that 
prompt settlement is very important if the WTO is to function effectively.  It sets out in considerable 
detail the procedures and the timetable to be followed in resolving disputes.  If a case runs its full 
course to a first ruling, it should not normally take more than about one year or 15 months if the 
case is appealed.  The agreed time limits are flexible, and if the case is considered urgent, it is 
accelerated as much as possible.17 
   Concerning the blocking of ruling, the Uruguay Round agreement made it impossible 
for the country losing their case to block the adoption of the ruling. Under the previous 
GATT procedure, rulings could only be adopted by consensus, meaning that just a single 
objection could block the ruling.  Now, rulings are automatically adopted unless there is a 
consensus to reject a ruling.  Hence, any country, which wants to block a ruling, has to 
persuade all other WTO members to share its view.18 
                                                          
16  World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division, 
Understanding the WTO, p.55, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatise/tife/disp1 
e.htm> at 20 August 2013. 
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement 3.1 
Overview, p.42, <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add11_en.pdf > at 20 August 
2013. 
18 World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division, 
Understanding the WTO, p.56, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/disp1e.htm> 
at 20 August 2013.  
64 | A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปีที ่5 ฉบบัที ่1 มกราคม – มถุินายน 2557    
   Although much of the procedure does resemble a court or tribunal, the preferred 
solution is for the countries concerned to discuss their problems and settle the dispute by 
themselves.  The first stage is therefore consultations between the governments concerned, 
and even when the case has progressed to other stages, consultation and mediation are 
still always possible.19 
  
(III) The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) 
The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) is the General Council.  In brief, the DSB is the 
WTO General Council acting in a specialized role under a separate chair.  The DSB administers 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), which 
regulates dispute settlement under all WTO agreements.  Moreover, the DSB has the sole 
authority to establish “Panels” to consider the case, and to decide the outcome of a trade 
dispute on the recommendation of a Dispute Penels and on a report from the Appellate 
Body of WTO, which may have amended the Panels recommendation.20 In this manner, the 
DSB can make their decision on the disputes based on the recommendations of the Panels 
and Appellate Body.  
   For the decision making of the DSB, it uses a special decision procedure known as 
“reverse consensus” or “consensus against”.21 This process requires that the 
recommendations of the Panels (as amended by the Appellate Body) should be adopted 
unless there is a consensus of the members against adoption.  In reality, this outcome is 
improbable because the winning party should normally have to join in on this reverse 
consensus.  
   Whether the complaint had been shown to be right or wrong, the DSB may direct 
the losing party to take action to bring its laws, regulations or policies into conformity with 
the WTO Agreements.  The DSB will give the losing party a reasonable period of time in 
which to restore the conformity of its laws.  If the losing party ignores or fails to restore the 
conformity of its laws within the reasonable period of time, the DSB may authorise a 
successful complainant to take retaliatory measures or trade sanctions to induce action on 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 
20 Ibid., 
21 Ibid., 
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the part of the losing party.  Nevertheless, when a losing party brings its laws into 
conformity it may choose how to do so because there is no concept of “punishment”.  
Hence, the losing party may not necessarily make the changes that the winning party would 
like them to.22 
 
(IV) The WTO dispute settlement mechanism23 
When the dispute arises between the member states, the process of the WTO dispute 
settlement should be considered by the parties in the dispute and functions in three main steps 
as follows; 
1). Consultation - (Takes approximately up to 60 days). Before taking any other actions, the 
countries in dispute are encouraged to talk to each other in order to settle their disputes by 
themselves.  If that fails, then they can ask the WTO director-general to mediate or try to 
help in some other manner (such as the establishment of Panels). 
2). Panel - (Takes approximately up to 45 days for the appointment of a panel, and more than 6 
months for final panel reports to parties).  If the dispute could not be resolved by consultation, 
the complaining country can ask the WTO director-general to appoint the panel.  The panel 
consist of three (possibly five) experts (so-called “Panelists”) from different countries.  Panelists 
for each case can be chosen from a permanent list of well-qualified candidates, or from 
elsewhere.  Basically, they are independent and serve in their individual capacities to discover 
and interpret the fact and the law.  They also cannot receive any instruction from any 
government.  In reality, although the panels meet in secret and are not required to alert national 
parliaments that their laws have been challenged by another country, the countries in dispute 
usually try to lobby Panelists to achieve the greatest benefits.   
   However, the country “in the dock” can block the creation of the panel once, but 
when the DSB meets for a second time, the appointment can no longer be blocked unless 
there is a consensus against appointing the panel.  
   After Panelists consider all evidences, then they will send the panel’s report into the 
DSB in order to make rulings or recommendations and, in this capacity, the DSB can only 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 
23 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement 3.2 
Panels, <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add12_en.pdf > at 20 August 2013. 
66 | A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปีที ่5 ฉบบัที ่1 มกราคม – มถุินายน 2557    
reject the report by consensus.  Hence, the panel’s findings have to be based on the DSU 
as follows;24 
 Before the first hearing - each party in the dispute must present its case in writing to the 
panel. 
 First hearing - the complaining country, the responding country, and another 
country, which have announced that they have an interest in the dispute, make their 
case at the panel’s first hearing. 
 Rebuttals - the countries involved submit written rebuttals and present oral 
arguments at the panel’s second meeting. 
 Experts - if one party raises scientific or other technical matters, the panel may 
consult specific experts or appoint an expert review group to prepare an advisory 
report. 
 First draft - the panel submits the descriptive sections of its report to the two sides, 
giving them at least two weeks to comment. This report does not include findings 
and conclusions. 
 Interim report - the panel then submits an interim report, including its findings and 
conclusions to the parties, giving them at least one week to ask for a review. 
 Review - the period of review must not exceed two weeks. During that time, the 
panel may hold additional meetings with the parties. 
 Final report - a final report is submitted to the parties and three weeks later, it is 
circulated to all WTO members. If the panel decides that the disputed trade measure 
does break a WTO agreement or an obligation, it recommends that the measure be 
made to conform to the WTO rules.  The panel may suggest how this could be 
done. 
                                                          
24 World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division, 
Understanding the WTO, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm > 
at 20 August 2013. 
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 The report becomes a ruling - the report becomes the DSB’s ruling or 
recommendation within 60 days unless there is a consensus against it.  Both parties 
can also appeal the report if they don’t agree with its report. 
 
3). Appeals – (Takes approximately up to 60-90 days) the parties can appeal a panel’s 
ruling.  They cannot re-examine existing evidence or examine new issues.  Appeals have to 
be only based on matters of law such as legal interpretation.   
   Each appeal is heard by three members (“Judges”) of a permanent seven-member 
Appellate Body set up by the DSB and broadly representing the choice of WTO 
membership.  Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms.  They have to be 
independent individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, 
not affiliated with any government.  The appeal can uphold, modify or reverse the panel’s 
legal findings and conclusions.  Normally appeals should not last more than 60 days, with 
an absolute maximum of 90 days.  The DSB has to accept or reject the appeals report 
within 30 days, and rejection of this is only possible by consensus.25 Generally, the total time 
taken, in case without appeal, is approximate 1 year and 1 year plus 3 months in case there 
is an appeal.  
 
(V) The enforcement of the decision 
Unlike most other international organizations, the WTO has significant power to 
enforce its decisions through the authorization of trade sanctions against members which 
fail to comply with its decision. 
   At this level, the priority is for the losing defendant to bring its policy into line with 
the ruling or recommendations.  The dispute settlement agreement stresses that “prompt 
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members”.  This means the losing party 
must follow the recommendations in the panel report or the appealate body.  It must state its 
intention to do so at a Dispute Settlement Body meeting held within 30 days of the report’s 
                                                          
25 See the Structure of the panel process at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm> at 28 August 2013. 
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adoption.  If complying with the recommendation immediately proves impractical, the member will 
be given a “reasonable period of time” to do so.  If the losing party fails to act within this period, it 
has to enter into negotiations with the complaining country in order to determine mutually-
acceptable compensation.  For example, tariff reductions in areas of particular interest to the 
complaining party.26   
   If after 20 days, no satisfactory compensation is agreed upon, the complaining party may 
ask the DSB for permission to impose limited trade sanctions against the losing party.  The DSB 
must grant this authorization within 30 days of the expiry of the “reasonable period of time” 
unless there is a consensus against the request.   
   In principle, the sanctions should be imposed in the same sector as the dispute.  If this is 
not practical or if it would not be effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a different sector of 
the same agreement.  On the other hand, if this is not effective or practical and if the 
circumstances are serious enough, the action can be taken under another agreement.  The 
objective is to minimize the chances of actions spilling over into unrelated sectors while at the 
same time allowing the actions to be effective.  In any case, the Dispute Settlement Body 
monitors how adopted rulings are implemented.  Any outstanding case remains on its 
agenda until the issue is resolved. 
   So in a practical sense, there are usually three choices for the losing country which 
are (1) the losing country have to change their law or regulation to conform to the DSB 
requirements, (2) pay ongoing compensation to the complaining country, or (3) face trade 
sanctions.  
   In conclusion, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is usually (i) state-to-state, 
(ii) require consultations before members litigate, (iii) offers optional entrance to negotiation, 
mediation, and conciliation, (iv) provides formal arbitration if consultations are unsuccessful 
and, (v) uses trade sanctions as enforcement mechanism.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26  World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division, 
Understanding the WTO, p.58, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/disp1e.htm > 
at 20 August 2013. 
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PART II: CASE STUDY (MEXICO SOFT DRINKS) 
(I) Background27 
Under NAFTA (“North American Free Trade Agreement”), Mexico received a sugar 
quota for export to the US.  Practically, Mexico could not apply those quota rights.  In 
addition, Mexico had tried to enforce those quota rights via NAFTA Chapter 20 panel.  
However, it was not successful because the US continued to block the appointment of panel 
members which Mexico established to examine US restrictions on Mexican sugar.  Finally, 
because of this blockage, Mexico decided to respond unilaterally with the tax measures 
against the US.  
   On January 1, 2002, Mexico imposed the 20 percent tax on soft drinks and other 
beverages. The beverage tax was only applied to soft drinks using sweeteners (such as 
HFCS28or beet sugar) other than sugar cane.  This meant that the soft drinks sweetened 
exclusively with sugar cane were tax-exempt.  The new beverage tax measure had an 
immediate effect on HFCS because HFCS accounted for 99 percent of Mexico's sweetener 
imports.  In brief, Mexico imposed a tax designed to discriminate against imports, especially US 
imports.  Finally, the US asked the WTO to establish the panel with a complaint which claimed 
that the Mexico’s beverage tax was inconsistent with Mexico's national treatment obligations 
under Articles III of GATT 1994.  The US also alleged that these tax measures treated imported 
soft drinks less favorably than their "like" domestic counterparts. (In Mexico, sugar cane is 
almost exclusively a domestic product.)  Finally, the WTO Panel had found that these tax 
measures discriminated against imports.   
   According to Mexico, Mexico did not appeal the Panel’s conclusions that the 
mentioned tax measures were inconsistent with Mexico’s national treatment obligations 
under Article III of GATT 1994.  At the same time, Mexico requested the WTO Panel to 
decline  to exercise its jurisdiction, and recommended to the parties that they submit their 
complaint to an arbitral panel under the NAFTA.  The NAFTA dispute settlement forum 
could better address the substantive claims in this case which were linked to a dispute 
                                                          
27 WTO, Report of the Panel on Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (7 October 2005), p. 18, < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/308r-0_e.doc 
> at 22 August 2013. 
28 HFCS comes from high fructose corn syrup. 
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regarding market access for Mexican sugar cane in the United States under the NAFTA.  
Mexico also argued that, as for its tax measures, they were designed to secure compliance 
by the US of NAFTA law, the alleged tax measures were justified under the GATT Article 
XX (d) exception.  Declining Mexico's request not to exercise its jurisdiction in this case, the 
panel ruled against Mexico on both the substantive claims as well as the GATT article XX 
(d) justification.  Mexico appealed the panel's decision on the jurisdiction issue and the 
GATT Article XX (d) exception only. 
 
(II) Legal Issues 
Based on this case, there are two main legal issues that linked up with the topic as 
follows; 
1). Can the WTO Panel exercise its jurisdiction? 
 At a panel level, Mexico had asked the WTO Panel to decline and to exercise its 
jurisdiction in this dispute in support of the Arbitral Panel that was established under the 
NAFTA.  In brief, Mexico tried to use the WTO Panel decision in order to put additional 
pressure on the US to appoint the panelists under the NAFTA.  The WTO Panel rejected 
Mexico’s request on the ground that, under the DSU, it did not have the discretion to decide 
not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case that has been properly brought before it.29  
   Nevertheless, in the appeal process, Mexico did not argue that the WTO Panel had 
jurisdiction to hear the US complaint.  Instead, Mexico argued that the WTO Panel had the 
power to abstain from ruling on them and should have exercised this power for this dispute.  
The Appellate Body agreed with Mexico that WTO Panel had the power, which included the 
right to determine whether they had jurisdiction, the scope of their jurisdiction, and the right 
to exercise jurisdiction by declining to rule on the claims.  
   However, the Appellate Body recalled its ruling that the discretion of Panel did not 
extend to modify the substantive provisions of the DSU.  Furthermore, the Appellate Body 
agreed with the Panel’s conclusion that a WTO Panel would seem not to be in a position to 
choose freely whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction.  The Appellate Body also 
                                                          
29 WTO, Report of the Panel on Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (7 October 2005), p. 22, < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/308r-
0_e.doc > at 22 August 2013. 
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considered Mexico’s position that the US claimed under Article III of GATT were 
“inextricably linked to a broader dispute and only a NAFTA panel could resolve the dispute as 
a whole”.  However, the Appellate Body stated that “accepting Mexico’s interpretation would 
imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and 
obligations outside the covered agreement”.  So this meant that in this case there was no 
ground in the DSU for the panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes. 
 
2). Can the GATT exception (Article XX) be used to secure compliance with another 
Member’s international obligations? 
Article XX (d) of GATT stated that “ Subject to the requirement that such measure are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article 
XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices.”30 
   This Article provides, in part, that nothing under the GATT shall prevent the adoption 
or enforcement by any contracting party of measures that is necessary to secure 
compliance with laws or regulations, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
   Mexico argued that their tax measure were justified under Article XX (d) of GATT as 
measures were necessary to secure compliance by the US with US national obligations 
under the NAFTA.  Mexico also described its tax measures as temporary and proportionate 
measures intended to persuade the US in order to comply with its NAFTA commitments 
regarding market access conditions for Mexican sugar. 
                                                          
30 WTO, Report of the Panel on Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (7 October 2005), p. 31, < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/308r-0_e.doc 
> at 22 August 2013. 
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The point in the appeal was as to whether the term “to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations” under Article XX (d) of GATT included WTO inconsistent measures that were 
applied by the WTO Member to secure compliance with another WTO member’s obligations 
under an international agreement. (In this case, it was referred to NAFTA). 
   The Appellate Body defined the term of “laws or regulations” under Article XX (d) of 
GATT to mean as “rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member 
including rules deriving from international agreements that had been incorporated into the 
domestic legal system of a WTO Member”.31 This means the “law or regulations”, which a 
Member seeks to secure compliance for exclude obligations of another WTO Member under 
an international agreement.  In addition, the Appellate Body defined the term “to secure 
compliance” as “to enforce compliance”.  However, the Appellate Body noted that Article XX 
(d) did not require “the use of coercion”.32  
   Hence, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Article XX (d) of GATT was not 
available to justify the inconsistent of WTO measures that seek to secure compliance by 
another WTO Member with other Member’s international obligations. 
 
(III) Impacts of the decision 
Based on the decision, another interesting question arises from dispute settlement 
provisions under RTAs (“Regional Trade Agreement”) and the WTO which is “can the 
dispute settlement provisions of bilateral agreements (such as NAFTA) be applied by panels 
and the WTO Appellate Body?” 
  There are a few points to be considered when asking this aforementioned question: 
1). Jurisdiction of the WTO Panel – The Appellate Body judged that the complaint must be 
claimed under WTO covered agreement only. (For further information at paragraphs 5633and 7834 
of WTO Appellate Body, Report on Mexico-Soft drinks, on 22 August 2013). 
                                                          
31 WTO, Report of the Panel on Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (7 October 2005), p.163, < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/308r-0_e.doc 
> at 22 August 2013. 
32 Ibid., 
33 Paragraph 56 “…we note that this would entail a determination whether the United 
States has acted consistently or inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations.  We see no basis 
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2). Interpretation of WTO provisions – Prof. Joost Pauwelyn, from Duke Law School 
believed that even if the WTO has jurisdiction to decide claims under WTO covered agreement 
only, this limited jurisdiction of WTO panels does not mean that WTO panels cannot refer to 
non-WTO treaties (such as NAFTA).  Hence, the reference can be made to outside treaties as 
long as they reflect the common understanding of all WTO members. 
3). Applicable law for the resolution of WTO claims – This point and question remain 
unresolved because the WTO Appellate Body did not decide this issue and paragraphs 56 
and 78 of WTO Appellate Body related to the jurisdiction of WTO panel, and not the 
question of applicable law.   
Hence, the answer for this question is the dispute settlement provisions of bilateral 
agreements (such as NAFTA) which cannot be applied by panels and the WTO Appellate 
Body because NAFTA is a Non-WTO covered agreement.  
   In my point of view inspired by Frieder Roeseeler, an Executive Director of Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law, this case makes a few questions stand out to me.  If the dispute 
settlement provisions of bilateral trade agreements can be applied by the WTO Panels and 
the WTO Appellate Body, the WTO can get involved to judge the dispute based on another 
Non-WTO agreements (such as NAFTA, APEC and etc.).  On the other hands, the WTO 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in the DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes.  Article 3.2 
of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system “serves to preserve the rights 
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements”.  Accepting Mexico’s interpretation would imply that the 
WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and obligations outside 
the covered agreements….” 
34 Paragraph 78 “…Mexico’s interpretation would imply that, in order to resolve the 
case, WTO panels and the Appellate Body would have to assume that there is a violation of 
the relevant international agreement (such as NAFTA) by the complaining party, or they 
would have to assess whether the relevant international agreement has been violated.  
WTO panels and the Appellate Body would become adjudicators of non-WTO disputes.  As 
we noted earlier, this is not the function of panels and the Appellate Body as intended by 
the DSU…” 
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regulation (Such as DSU) is an international law, and then it should not be affected by 
another agreement (such as NAFTA). 
 
   However, if the WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body do not agree to apply other 
dispute settlement provisions of bilateral trade agreements (such as NAFTA) in the same manner 
as they did in the Mexico Soft Drinks case, this brings to an overlapping problem between different 
dispute processes. (NAFTA v. WTO)  Firstly, in this dispute, there is an overlap between NAFTA 
(Chapter 20 regarding general disputes) and the WTO dispute settlement process relied upon by 
the US.  Secondly, the WTO process overlaps with three ongoing investor-state complaints under 
NAFTA (Chapter 11 regarding investment).  The complaint in both cases is also claimed to be the 
violation of national treatment.   
   The proceeding problem has to do with the forum selection or forum shopping.  For 
example, the US had done this in the Canada – Periodicals cases which the US decided to 
bring its case to the WTO instead of NAFTA because there is a cultural industries exception 
under NAFTA.35 In the Mexico soft drinks case, the US firstly blocked the appointment of 
panelists under Chapter 20 of NAFTA.  When Mexico did exactly what the US used to do in 
the old GATT days in response to blockage at NAFTA, the US immediately objected with a 
WTO complaint.  Then, the WTO said that they were not in a position to choose freely 
whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction.  Hence, this dispute still is an unresolved dispute, 
even the WTO got involved, because, based on a sugar quota for export to the US under 
NAFTA, Mexico could not enforce the US to participate both of NAFTA and WTO.   
   
PART III: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
In the end, the main issue, which everyone should be concerned with, is regarding 
the decision of the DSB on Mexico Soft Drinks case and the question of the overlap with 
multilateral dispute settlement.  These questions also bring such doubts into the WTO 
members regarding the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement provisions.  In 
                                                          
35Frieder Roessler, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages 
(DS308), p.7, <http://www.ali.org/doc/wto/wto2006_2007/2-%2010-8-08-SoftDrinksCase-
CmtsRoessler.pdf> at 22 August 2013. 
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principle, the overlap should not always exist because different treaties have different 
substantive obligations and the dispute settlement provisions incorporated into those treaties 
which have to do with the enforcement of such obligations.   
   Based on the main objective of the WTO dispute settlement provision in order to 
secure a positive solution to a dispute,36 this decision (Mexico Soft drinks) seems so far 
from a positive solution to a dispute.  Moreover, this mentioned question might decrease the 
confidence of the WTO members for the expectation of the WTO dispute settlement 
provision.  Hence, if the WTO dispute settlement provision cannot effectively resolved the 
dispute, then the WTO law is no longer of any consequence in the international level 
because the parties, especially the developing countries (such as Mexico or another), will 
not trust the WTO dispute settlement provision and finally use their own ways to retaliate in 
the same fashion as Mexico did against the U.S.  
   Finally, as a mentioned comment of Prof. Joost Pauwelyn, I think that the WTO should 
open its mind to other treaties (such as NAFTA) by accepting such clauses as Forum selection 
clauses under NAFTA Article 2005,37 where the parties can choose where to go when there is a 
dispute regarding a matter arising under both NAFTA and the WTO.  However, if the parties 
make a choice, then the other forum can no longer be used.  
   On the other hands, I think that developing countries (such as Mexico in this case), 
should be careful to lunch a dispute process that cannot be blocked by the other side when 
they negotiate bilateral trade agreement, and also carefully consider their actions and to 
anticipate the economic and political effects of launching these particular disputes as well as 
                                                          
36 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement 3.2 
Panels, p.3, <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add12_en.pdf > at 20 August 2013. 
37 NAFTA (1994), Article 2005 GATT Dispute Settlement stated that “1. Subject to 
paragraph 2, 3 and 4, dispute regarding any matter arising under both this Agreement and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated there under, or any 
successor agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the 
complaining Part…” and “6. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under 
Article 2007 pr dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under GATT, the forum 
selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other, unless a Party makes a request 
pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4”  
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the expected legal outcome before taking litigation.  In my personal point of view, Mexico’s 
legal position in this case was too weak, and it made many arguments which were tenuous at 
the best.  So we as a developing country need to say thank you to Mexico because this case 
offers us some lessons to beware of and consider more innovative and new strategies in WTO 
litigation. 
 
